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1. Introduction 
As far as contemporary economically advanced societies are concerned, it 
would be hardly deniable that people’s search for happiness is significantly affected 
not only by the satisfaction of material needs, but also by several non-material sources 
such as psychological and social factors, as well as by the pursuit of complex, 
morally-charged goals, as a growing body of experimental and empirical 
contributions tends to confirm (see e.g. Easterlin, 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; 
Rabin, 2002). Recent evidence suggests that money is less and less able to buy 
happiness and, in this light, Rabin (1993) correctly remarks that “Welfare economics 
should be concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material goods, but also 
with designing institutions such that people are happy about the way they interact 
with others”. These two types of objectives (i.e. material and non-material ones) seem 
to interplay in complex ways, as, for instance, it is often the case that the pursuit of 
non-material ends such as the search for social prestige or freedom of choice crucially 
passes through the attainment of monetary gains. As an example of this, we may think 
of a status-seeking agents deciding to buy a luxury car or an expensive yacht in order 
to more effectively signal a given status level (regardless of its reflecting his actual 
social position or not): in his view, status acts as a source of (positional) utility 
directly provided by the (instrumental) relationship established with other subjects 
belonging to his ‘reference group’. It seems clear, then, that, insofar as we aim at 
getting significant insights over the often paradoxical meanings of a multifaceted 
notion such as ‘happiness’ within advanced economic systems, the above recalled 
interplays need to be seriously taken into account. 
Within such a complex framework, the specific aim of this essay is to provide 
a contribution to the understanding of the aforementioned relationship (between 
material and non-material determinants of individual happiness) in the context of non-
cooperative game theory. The point is that while both theoretical and empirical 
studies on happiness have been rapidly growing in the last years, we still lack 
researches focusing on the attempt to reconcile happiness with game theory, i.e. to 
analyze happiness within strategic interaction scenarios. As Section 2 will show, 
exploring the connection between happiness and non-cooperative game theory is 
crucial as, in strategic interaction situations, players’ subjective conception of 
happiness alters their evaluation of each possible outcome. One of the major purposes 
of this methodological work is to shed light on the primitive concepts constituting   3
two-player, simultaneous-move non-cooperative games in order to properly account 
for the crucial interplays taking place between (suitably defined) ‘preferences’ and 
moral principles. In order to do so, the following issues will be specifically addressed: 
what kind of difficulties arise when a relevant, non-material source of individual 
happiness such as morality is included into the pay-offs of the game? Can we 
incorporate any moral principles within individual pay-offs? 
The structure of the remainder of the essay is the following. In Section 2 we 
briefly recall some of the main stages in the history of utility and happiness in 
economics, with a special focus on the relevance of the so called ‘Pareto turn’ and on 
the most significant features of the ‘revealed preference’ approach. Section 3 shows 
that non-cooperative game theory can deal with some moral principles (the ones we 
label as ‘preferential’ moral principles) through a proper respecification of individual 
pay-offs (shifting from standard to ‘extended’ pay-offs). In Section 4, however, we 
make clear that ‘non-preferential’ moral principles, such as Kantian principle of 
universalizability, cannot be satisfactorily modeled by simply respecifying players’ 
pay-offs: with regard to this set of moral principles, we suggest to take a step forward, 
as the very nature of principles of morality other than utility maximization calls for 
non-utilitarian solution concepts. In Section 5, we shed light on what we term the ‘as 
if paradoxes of happiness in economics’, i.e. on the paradoxical implication according 
to which, in some social settings, even utility-maximizers get better results by acting 
‘as if’ they were driven by a non-utilitarian moral principle. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Rational Choices and Revealed Preferences in Non-cooperative Games 
Before directly entering into the major theoretical issues addressed in this 
work, a preliminary methodological clarification is in order. In dealing with the 
themes specified above, we will often have recourse to what is probably the most 
well-known among two-person, non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD)
2. However, we maintain that most of the considerations developed in Sections 2, 
3, 4 and 5 hold also insofar as we refer to other relevant strategic interaction scenarios 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, several real-life situations where collective action problems are likely to arise 
would call for the generalized version of the PD, i.e. the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (or Social 
Dilemma). However, for simplicity, we will keep on exclusively referring to the classic one-shot PD 
setting, though we believe that most of the qualitative considerations developed here extend naturally 
to larger and more complex social environments.   4
that lend themselves to be modeled in game-theoretic terms. The main reason for 
choosing the PD as the reference social structure is twofold. First, many of the game 
theorists, economists and philosophers quoted and critically commented here with 
regard to the methodological issues at stake (such as Ken Binmore, Amartya Sen, 
Elizabeth Anderson and Robert Sugden) have often clarified their positions by 
directly referring to this game. In this light, shifting from one author to another by 
always considering the same game structure should help in expositional terms. 
Second, the PD can be seen as the metaphor par excellence of social situations
  where 
(a) individualistic rationality fails and (b) even utility-maximizing agents would reach 
better results by acting on principles of action other than Nash behavior (or, at least, 
by acting as if they were driven by ‘proper’ non-utilitarian principles; see on this 
Section 5). Therefore, such a game structure will play a critical role in making clear 
the main implications drawn in the present contribution with regard to a 
characterization of happiness within strategic interaction scenarios
3.  
According to the ‘revealed preference’ approach, individual preferences are to 
be interpreted in terms of choice, as choices ‘reflect’ preferences. As Sen (1982) 
observes: “Preference here is simply defined as the binary relation underlying 
consistent choice. In this case ‘counter-preferential’ choice is not empirically 
different, but simply impossible. Non-preferential choice is, of course, possible, since 
the choices may lack the consistency needed for identifying a binary relation of 
preference, but obviously it cannot be the case that such an identified preference 
relation exists and the choices are ‘counter’ to it”. In this light, we are already able to 
draw a simple, direct implication from this characterization of preferences: choice, not 
preference, ends up being the basic, ‘salient’ concept of any theory grounded on such 
definition of preferences. Savage’s formal theory seems to prove this as “although 
Savage’s axioms are formulated in terms of the concept of preference, it seems that he 
                                                 
 
3 At this stage, though this will appear to many as an obvious remark, it is worth pointing out that, 
while hereafter and throughout the paper we will take for granted that in a PD the Pareto-efficient 
outcome of mutual cooperation is individually and socially desirable, we are not claiming that, with 
regard to real-life situations having the PD structure, the same proposition holds from the point of view 
of society as a whole. Such a broader conclusion would hold only if (i) either the set of players 
coincided with the set of all citizens or (ii) interaction within this setting brought about beneficial 
effects for society as a whole (as it is the case when, say, the voluntary provision of a public good such 
as education, environment preservation or health is concerned). See on this Sacco and Zarri (2002). 
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regards choice as the more fundamental concept: the idea is to construct a theory of 
rational choice, not of rational preferences” (Sugden, 1991; italics added).  
However, it is important to point out that the reasons behind the greater 
salience of ‘choice’ with respect to ‘preference’ are not purely theoretical, but also 
historical. In this regard, the decisive moment in the history of economic thought 
coincides with the so called ‘Pareto turn’ (or ‘indifference-curve’ or ‘ordinalism 
revolution’), the event that starts driving a wedge between neoclassical thinkers and 
contemporary scholars as to the interpretation of ‘utility’. The early neoclassical 
economists tended to explain preferences by postulating a one-dimensional scale of 
inner psychological experience (referred to in terms of ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’), but 
the difficulties arising from the search for such measure pushed economists to 
gradually adopt a revealed preference approach to utility, where “preferences are 
whatever dispositions lie behind observed choices, and the formal properties of 
preference which guarantee an ordering – completeness, reflexivity and transitivity – 
are postulated as properties of rationality” (Sugden, 2001). Sugden (2002) maintains 
that, after the Paretian turn, the concept of the utility function has been retained, but 
has been re-interpreted as a representation of individual preferences, which in turn are 
seen as whatever the agent takes to be choice-relevant reasons. Ng (1997) correctly 
observes that the main motives justifying such methodological revolution – related to 
the attempt to make economic analysis based on more objective grounds – are quite 
clear and sound, but he also adds that all this has been carried to an excess, preventing 
economics from successfully dealing with several important issues. He further 
interestingly asserts that psychology went through a similar process, due to the 
Watson-Skinner behaviorist revolution, recently resulting in the well-known cognitive 
turn.  
The above argument clearly indicates that the historical process briefly 
described, while making choice the central concept of economic theory, has started 
assigning a less and less relevant role to the classical notion of ‘utility’
4, certainly the 
conceptual category which turned out to be more closely related to the idea of 
                                                 
4 In his pioneering contribution to the theory of ‘revealed preferences’, Samuelson (1938) argued that 
his aim was “to develop the theory of consumer’s behaviour freed from any vestigial traces of the 
utility concept” (quoted in Sen, 1973). With reference to this approach, Little (1949) asserted that “the 
new formulation is scientifically more respectable [since] if an individual’s behaviour is consistent, 
then it must be possible to explain that behaviour without reference to anything other than behaviour” 
(quoted in Sen, 1973). 
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‘happiness’. As a consequence, happiness itself has never played thereafter a 
significant role in economics: therefore, if today we wish to re-descover the 
importance of such a concept and to incorporate it into the formal structure of 
economic theory – in the light of a rather stimulating wave of empirical and 
experimental studies centered either directly on happiness or on specific components 
of it –  we need to understand whether (re)introducing happiness in our theory is 
compatible with the maintenance of a ‘revealed preference’ approach. In this regard, 
from the point of view of the historical evolution of ideas on the theme, it seems to be 
the case that bringing happiness back into economics will take the form of a sort of 
theoretical counter-revolution, with respect to the Pareto turn recalled above.  
According to Sen and Williams (1982), however, the whole picture is even 
more complex and blurred, as the two different interpretations of preference (i.e. the 
pre-Paretian, Benthamite perspective and the post-Paretian, choice-centered view 
previously mentioned) still ambiguously coexist within contemporary economic 
theory. Further, they observe that “The ambiguity of the term ‘preference’ facilitates 
this dual picture of utility, since linguistic convention seems to permit the treatment of 
‘preferring’ as choosing as well as taking what a person (really) ‘prefers’ as what 
would make him better off”.  Sen (1994) expresses a similar view by claiming that 
both a choice-salience interpretation and a well-being interpretation of preference are 
present in contemporary economics. In this regard, we may add that Kahneman et 
al.’s (1997) well-known distinction between decision utility and experienced utility 
seems to conceptually parallel the same dichotomy. On the same vein, Rabin (1997) 
asserts that “For positive analysis, the usefulness of the utility-maximization 
framework depends on whether choice data can be usefully organized by positing that 
people maximize stable utility functions. A more controversial and rarer question 
about this framework is whether the preferences which people seem to maximize 
correspond to the well-being they actually experience. Many economists consider 
such a question off limits, feeling that ‘by definition’ the actions of informed people 
reflect what makes them happy. But there is a coherent sense in which even outcomes 
intentionally chosen may not maximize a decision maker’s experienced well-being”.  
As far as game theory is specifically concerned, it is important to notice that 
this discipline was born after the crucial Pareto turn occurred in economics: as a 
consequence, in its intense development during the last decades, the process of 
progressive construction of its formal structure has been deeply rooted within a   7
behavioristic, revealed preference approach. As Sugden (1991) points out: “When 
economists and game theorists feel obliged to justify their use of these concepts, they 
still turn to Savage”. However, while recognizing such a close connection between 
behaviorism and game theory is not a difficult task, justifications of it on 
methodological grounds are not so easy to find. A rather relevant (and probably the 
most significant) exception is Binmore’s massive work (1994; 1998), which contains 
inter alia a systematic attempt to explain in which sense the methodological 
foundations of non-cooperative game theory necessarily lie in a strong version of the 
revealed preferences perspective. More specifically, it is the case that, insofar as one 
mechanically transfers this approach to game theory, then Binmore’s position 
automatically follows: formally, there are no reasons why we should not incorporate 
‘whatever affects choice’ into players’ preferences, i.e. into game pay-offs.  
 
 
 3. ‘Extended Pay-offs’ and ‘Preferential’ Moral Principles    
Binmore (1994) affirms that “It is a common source of misunderstanding for it 
to be thought that game theorists intend a payoff to be some naïve measure of a 
player’s individual welfare, like a sum of money. However, game theory is based on 
the principle that the players act as though seeking to maximize the  payoff they 
receive at the end of the game. A naïve view of the nature of a payoff will therefore 
sometimes not suffice. For example, it is easy to quote situations, especially in a 
moral context, where almost nobody would regard the amount of money that he gets 
as being the major determinant in deciding what to do. Game theorists therefore 
understand the notion of a payoff in a sophisticated way that makes it tautologous that 
players act as though maximizing their payoffs. Such a sophisticated view makes it 
hard to measure payoffs in real-life games, but its advantage in keeping the logic 
straight is overwhelming”.  
Our judgments are often biased by the belief that well-known categories such 
as, say, ‘goods’ or ‘externalities’ represent objective features of economic 
interactions. By claiming this, we tend to forget that, by contrast, characterizing a 
certain ‘object’ as a good or a bad, as a private or public good, as a relational or 
positional good or as a positive or negative externality always critically depends on 
the subjective value-system of the agents we are referring to in our analysis. The point 
is that while in a homogeneous and relatively simple society it will be quite easy for   8
its members to agree one with the other at this level, in a heterogeneous and relatively 
complex one differences in this regard are likely to be rather important and non-
negligible. Such a subject-dependence clearly holds also as far as the concept of 
‘game’ is concerned: the ranking of all possible outcomes of a non-cooperative game 
crucially depends on each agent’s value-system. For example, the same ‘material pay-
off’ can yield completely different consequences in terms of overall ‘subjective pay-
offs’ depending on players’ ‘motivations’, i.e. attitudes towards others. Properly 
speaking, each cell of a normal form game contains ‘utilities’, which can or cannot be 
a (more or less complex) function of some material pay-offs the game theorist 
considers significant for a proper description of the game. In this light, as far as 
individual goals are concerned, utilities can incorporate both an objective dimension 
(i.e. material rewards such as a sum of money) and a subjective one (critically 
dependent on each player’s values): therefore, via utilities, both dimensions can be 
simultaneously accounted for by the game theorist.  
In other words, it is the case that the same monetary pay-offs may translate 
into individuals’‘utilities’ in different ways, according to each agent’s ‘happiness 
technology’ (for this expression, see Menicucci and Sacco, 1996), in a world of 
motivationally heterogeneous players. We may add that, the more a society is 
motivationally heterogeneous, the greater the difference between monetary pay-offs 
and utilities and the more the description of the game in terms of ‘objective’ pay-offs 
is lacking and unsatisfactory. So far, our reasoning is perfectly compatible with 
Binmore’s revealed preference view: game pay-offs need not coincide with some 
naïve measure of individual welfare like a sum of money. If this has often been the 
case, the reason has basically to do with the well-known, strong historical salience of 
the self-interest assumption in both economics and game theory. It is only when 
material net benefits perfectly coincide with the underlying ‘utilities’ that it is totally 
legitimate to describe a game by identifying individual pay-offs with the physical 
consequences faced by each player in correspondence with each possible outcome
5.  
In recent years, with the development of behavioral and experimental 
economics, more and more studies have started focusing on ‘extended pay-offs’ 
incorporating not only material benefits but also psychological factors, social rewards 
                                                 
5 Even in this respect, the PD provides a clear example of such a coincidence: here, insofar as players 
are assumed to exclusively care about their material pay-offs, it makes sense to specify the game by 
inserting in each cell the ‘years of prison’ each of them would get as a consequence of the combination 
of his and his opponent’s strategic choices.   9
and moral principles: let us think of the literature on psychological games 
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Rabin, 1993) as well as of the related experimental works 
on positive and negative reciprocity (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 1999; 2002; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002). Inserting such non-material benefits into the pay-offs of the 
game is a fully legitimate operation right because of the above reasoning: insofar as 
these non-monetary goals are assumed to be a component of players’ ‘objective 
function’, there are no formal reasons preventing the model builder from taking them 
into account. In other words, we may assert that the relevance of the self-interest 
assumption in the history of economic thought has tended to make us forget that, on 
purely formal grounds, game theory is well equipped to deal with other, more 
complex and sophisticated objective functions as well. As Hollis (1994) observes, 
“strictly, the standard first principle assumes only that agents are guided by their own 
preferences. In this sense are as ‘self-interested’ as sinners and the theory of rational 
choice is not committed to any view about how saintly or sinful we are”
6.  
We ought to proceed even farther along this path, in order to lay stress on the 
following point: not only the model builder has access to formal tools which, in 
principle, are capable of properly taking such non-material rewards into account; 
insofar as such factors are considered important by the players themselves, he has to 
incorporate them into their ‘extended pay-offs’ (or ‘utilities’). When they are deemed 
important by the players, but, for some reasons, the game theorist expresses the pay-
offs in purely material terms, then the resulting game will necessarily turn out to be 
improperly specified, as what matters in a game are players’  preferences, not 
modeler’s ones. This observation seems to be in line with Ng’s (1997) view, 
according to which happiness is far more important than more objective concepts such 
as choice, preference and income as “happiness is the ultimate objective of most, if 
not all people (…) We want money (or anything else) only as a means to increase our 
happiness. If having more money does not substantially increase our happiness, then 
money is not very important, but happiness is”. 
With reference to Binmore’s objections to Sen’s (and also, implicitly, to 
Sugden’s) position, the major thesis defended here can be summarized as follows: on 
                                                 
6 On the same vein, Camerer (2003) claims that “The payoffs are utilities for consequences. That is, in 
the original game the consequences may be money, pride, reproduction by genes, territory in wars, 
company profits, pleasure, or pain. A key assumption is that players can express their satisfaction with 
these outcomes on a numerical utility scale. The scale must at least be ordinal – i.e. they would rather 
have an outcome with utility 2 than with utility 1 – and when expected utility calculations are made the 
scale must be cardinal (i.e., getting 2 is as good as a coin flip between 3 and 1)”.   10
the one hand, insofar as we adopt a purely utility-maximizing, instrumental view of 
rationality (where preferences – and, consequently, pay-offs – are broadly defined as 
‘whatever agents maximize’ when strategically interacting with each other), we may 
easily agree with Binmore that any preferences (including ‘moral preferences’) ought 
to be already embedded in the extended pay-offs of the game before the game starts. 
Hausman and McPherson (1994) seem to adopt a similar (though more prudent) view 
as they argue that “The standard theory of rationality says that A’s choices are 
determined by A’s preferences. This sounds a bit like the claim that A is self-
interested, but the impression is misleading. To say that A is self-interested is to make 
a claim about what A prefers. Utility theory does not rule out preferences for acting 
on moral principles or preferences for serving the interests of others. We are not 
claiming here that all moral theories are compatible with the standard theory of 
rationality. Our point is only that utility theory does not imply self-interest”. We 
perfectly agree with Binmore as well as with Hausman and McPherson that some 
moral principles are compatible with a maximizing framework, in both strategic and 
non-strategic interaction scenarios.  
In this light, if, say, a pre-play, material game takes the form of a PD but 
players are altruists, then, depending on their degree of altruism, the ‘proper’ or 
‘right’ game (i.e. the one that takes account of all the relevant dimensions and not 
only of the material one) may well take the form of either an Assurance Game (AG), 
where, both (cooperate, cooperate) and (defect, defect) are Nash Equilibria in pure 
strategies, or an Other-Regarding game (OR), where cooperation is the dominant 
strategy for both agents. Sen (1973) himself agrees on this point, as he has no 
difficulties in admitting that “the entire problem under discussion can be easily 
translated into the case in which each person does worry about the other’s welfare as 
well and is not concerned only with his own welfare. The numbers in the pay-off 
matrix can be interpreted simply as welfare indices of the two persons and each 
person’s welfare index can incorporate concern for the other”. What Sen is clarifying 
here is that insofar as we deal with a moral motivation such as altruism, defined as 
‘concern about the other’s welfare’ (elsewhere, he qualifies this motivation as 
‘sympathy’; see e.g. Sen, 1974), we can easily account for such moral category 
through a simple respecification of individual pay-offs, without altering any other 
element of the game as a whole. Selfish, altruistic or other types of preferences can be 
easily accommodated in the formal framework of non-cooperative game theory, as   11
game pay-offs are to be interpreted as ‘welfare indices’, reflecting players’ (possibly 
heterogeneous) motivational systems. 
 
 
4. ‘Non-preferential’ Moral Principles, Solution Concepts and Happiness 
The considerations developed in Section 3 show that not only selfish 
preferences but also pro-social (like altruism) or anti-social ones (like envy) can be 
easily modeled in game-theoretic terms, through a proper specification of individual 
pay-offs. However, it is worth asking the following question: do people systematically 
act on the basis of their preferences? Are all possible principles of action based on the 
attempt to maximally satisfy one’s preferences? Our point is that, insofar as we 
properly define individual preferences, we need to provide a negative answer to such 
questions. In particular, we claim that, for agent A, acting on her preferences may 
entail deciding not to act morally (and viceversa): in other words, it is intuitive to 
consider ‘preferential behavior’ as a form of action that may not be in line with a 
person’s moral system, but that, by contrast, is directly linked to her non-rational 
impulses and inclinations, so that, as we all know, serious inner conflicts may arise 
between personal preferences and moral prescriptions. In this light, the qualitative 
difference between the two types of action is well captured by the well-known 
Kantian distinction between autonomous and heteronomous behavior: as Van Hees 
(2003) observes, in such perspective “an individual can either act morally, or be under 
the sway of her inclinations, desires etc. If she acts morally, i.e. if she acts ‘from the 
moral law’, she is said to act autonomously. On the other hand, if she acts on the basis 
of her impulses, inclinations, etc., she is acting heteronomously”.  
In such interpretation, a person’s autonomy is closely related to the frequency 
of her morally justified actions, whereas forces such as desires and inclinations (that 
is, in our interpretation, ‘preferences’) would tend to make her behavior 
heteronomous. For example, with regard to Sen’s (1977) distinction between 
sympathy and commitment, we may argue that while sympathy can be considered as a 
‘preferential’ moral principle, commitment appears as a non-preferential one, as 
committing to a given behavior implies, by definition, acting against one’s (properly 
defined) preferences. At this stage, we maintain then that a meta-principle through 
which both forms of ‘preferential’ and ‘non-preferential’ behavior can be incorporated 
within a unifying framework is provided by Anderson’s (2001) priority claim:   12
 
The Priority of Identity to Rational Principle: what principle of choice it is rational to 
act on depends on a prior determination of personal identity, of who one is
7. 
 
Anderson’s claim highlights that there is something prior to behavioral choice: the 
choice of which principle of choice to act on. It is at this meta-choice level that agents 
have to decide whether to be, say, Kantian players, team thinkers (see Sugden, 2000) 
or utility maximizers. She is not arguing that only one principle of choice is rational, 
but simply asserting that the outcome of such a meta-choice crucially depends on the 
agent’s self-conception.  
Can we account for Anderson’s priority claim in game-theoretic terms? Let us 
assume that, with respect to a given strategic interaction scenario, some players’ 
identity is affected by preferential moral principles only but also that, say, other 
players’ identity depends on acting on non-preferential moral principles: are we 
allowed to model such situation in game-theoretic terms? Sugden (2001) criticizes 
Binmore’s (1994) interpretation of utility indices in games on the grounds that he has 
recourse to “a particularly strong form of revealed preference theory, in which it is a 
matter of definition that an individual’s choices always reveal her preferences. Thus, 
once a game has been specified, with utility indices for the various possible outcomes, 
certain propositions about what a player will do (for example, that she will not choose 
a dominated strategy) are necessary truths, and not merely the implications of 
particular solution concepts which game theorists are free to dispute (I: 104-110). I 
am not convinced that this is the most useful – or indeed the conventional – way of 
interpreting utility in games”. In the light of the above reasoning on Anderson’s 
priority claim and of Sen’s and other scholars’ defence of non-utilitarian moral 
concepts such as commitment or duty, Sugden’s critique to (strong forms of) the 
revealed preference approach sounds rather plausible: is it necessarily part of the 
definition of ‘pay-offs’ that players choose the strategy yielding the highest pay-off 
value, given the opponent’s strategy? Is such a definition implied by the formal 
structure of the game? In our view, we are allowed to provide a negative answer to 
                                                 
7 On the same vein, Zamagni (2003) asks the following question: “How can the idea of an agent who 
chooses autonomously and rationally be reconciled with the idea that happiness has to do not only with 
the satisfaction of preferences (utility) and thus of interests, but also with affections, emotions, moral 
dispositions – in a word, with personal identity?”.  
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this question, as, in principle, we may have recourse to different solution concepts 
with regard to the same game structure, i.e. we can assume that players choose by 
relying on principles of action other than a criterion based on a purely instrumental 
account of rationality such as utility maximization.  
Sen (1994) is very clear in stating that (a) there are deep reasons inducing us 
not to systematically respecify the pay-offs insofar as we want to incorporate in our 
formal structure concepts such as commitment and also that (b) these reasons, far 
from being exclusively formal, have a mainly substantive nature. In other words,   
matters like ‘what is the game’ correctly describing a given situation and ‘how should 
agents play it’ ought to be treated separately, as, with respect to a given game, 
different moral principles may be captured by distinct solution concepts. While 
knowing players’ (extended) pay-offs is crucial in order to correctly specify what 
game is going to be played, such information in itself is not sufficient to tell us how 
rational agents will play that game: insofar as we interpret extended pay-offs as 
reflecting agents’ preferences, their choices need not be mechanically driven by 
(extended) pay-offs only
8. We believe that Anderson’s priority claim allows us to 
draw such important implications for game theory: insofar as identity – and not 
preferences – is seen as the ‘primum movens’ of individuals’ choice process, we 
cannot rule out, ex ante, that a certain game’s pay-offs are common knowledge among 
the players but that such players, without behaving inconsistently, decide to act on a 
principle of action other than utility maximization. This is equivalent to assert that 
agents’ principle of action is not part of the definition of game pay-offs and that, 
therefore, the maximizing format need not universally apply.  
In particular, it  seems to us to be misleading to have recourse to such format 
when players’ decision process is significantly affected by non-preferential moral 
criteria. Further, in our view the above reasoning also entails that, other things being 
equal, a given game structure (say, a PD) keeps on being the same even if players’ 
                                                 
8 Camerer (2003) defines a game as consisting “of the ‘strategies’ each of several ‘players’ have, with 
precise rules for the order in which players choose strategies, the information they have when they 
choose, and how they rate the desirability (or ‘utility’) of resulting outcomes”. As we can see, how to 
play is not part of the definition of the game. He further adds: “It is important to distinguish games 
from game theory. Games are a taxonomy of strategic situations, a rough equivalent for social science 
of the periodic table of elements in chemistry. Analytical game theory is a mathematical derivation of 
what players with different cognitive capabilities are likely to do in games”. That he believes, as we do, 
that action may derive from decision criteria other than utility-maximization, can be inferred from the 
following statement: “Dominance is important because, if utility payoffs are correctly specified (…) 
and players care only about their own utility, there is no good reason to violate strict dominance” 
(italics added).   14
identity induces them to adopt a non-utilitarian mode of rationality: the point is that 
the departure from a logic of play such as utility maximization occurs at a level which 
is different from the (pre-play) level of (suitably defined) individual preferences 
(captured by properly specified game pay-offs)
9. According to the interpretation 
suggested in this essay, it would be unsatisfactory to avoid such departure in terms of 
logic of play by accomodating the moral principle under study through a simple 
respecification of the game’s pay-offs: the problem is that – unlike situations where 
morally-charged preferences such as altruism (or sympathy) are involved – by so 
doing we would simultaneously alter the very nature of such non-preferential moral 
criteria and, therefore, we would not do justice to them.  
By (a) introducing a rationality concept other than utility maximization and (b) 
preserving the original game structure, we are allowed to make such a non-utilitarian 
principle of action choice-relevant while at the same time making clear the distinction 
between preferential and non-preferential factors. Further, this approach is useful in 
order to comparatively analyze what actually happens (when a non-preferential 
solution concept is involved) and what would happen if the players were driven by 
their preferences only (i.e. if they decided by simply choosing the strategy yielding 
the highest pay-off): this clearly entails that counterpreferential choices may well 
occur within this scenario. As anticipated above, a further advantage of interpreting 
(a) pay-offs as reflecting individual preferences and (b) solution concepts in the light 
of the principles of action adopted by the players, without establishing any 
mechanical and necessary connection between (a) and (b), is the following: such a 
framework allows us to incorporate potential inner conflicts between preferences and 
non-preferential moral principles in the formal structure of a non-cooperative game, 
i.e. to explicitly consider the complex interplays taking place between different 
versions of rationality. This implies that, with reference to a given game structure, 
fruitful links between solution concepts and moral principles might be established, 
                                                 
9 In the light of these considerations, we do not agree with Binmore’s (1994) critique of Sen: according 
to Binmore, Sen is confusing “what has to be analyzed with how the analysis is conducted. When a 
game comes to be analyzed, intelligibility demands that matters like those raised by Sen should already 
have been incorporated into the structure of the game. If the players have the power to alter their 
preferences to commit themselves to behaving in certain ways before the play of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, then it is not the Prisoners’ Dilemma that they are playing, but some more complicated 
game. (…) Players cannot alter the game they are playing. If it seems like they can, it is because the 
game has been improperly specified”. 
   15
while at the same time making clear that both preferences and non-preferential moral 
criteria affect, to some degree, players’ choices. 
 
 
5. The paradoxes of happiness in strategic interaction scenarios 
Amartya Sen, in one of his classic contributions (Sen, 1985), focuses on three 
notions of ‘privateness’: (i) self-centered welfare, (ii) self-welfare goal, (iii) self-goal 
choice, claiming that such concepts are quite independent of each other: (i) a choice is 
not necessarily driven by the pursuit of a given goal; (ii) a goal is not necessarily 
aimed at increasing the person’s own welfare and, further, (iii) aiming at increasing 
one’s welfare does not always entail increasing one’s consumption levels. Kahneman 
et al.’s (1997) more recent and well-known distinction between decision utility 
(basically the choice-based characterization of utility Sen refers to) and experienced 
utility (conveying a Benthamite, content-based characterization of utility) seems to be 
partly related to Sen’s considerations: as far as individual ‘welfare’ or ‘happiness’ is 
concerned, choice may well happen to be ‘externally inconsistent’ (Hsee, 2003), i.e. it 
may reveal itself unable to increase the chooser’s happiness level
10. As Rabin (1997) 
observes, “Not knowing your own ‘experienced utility function’ is obviously 
important for the welfare implications of choice, and the main lesson of this material 
is that economists ought recognize that people may not correctly predict what makes 
them happy”.   
The point we would like to make here is that the above recalled wedge 
between choice and happiness is quite a general phenomenon, observable in both 
strategic and non-strategic interaction scenarios. As far as social environments where 
choice occurs under parametric conditions, several explanations can be 
simultaneously considered, like evolving aspirations (see Rabin, 1997; Easterlin, 
2001) and hedonic adaptation (see Frederic and Loewenstein, 1999). A further and not 
necessarily alternative explanation of the choice-happiness wedge is the one 
suggested by Hsee (2003), referring to this possibility as to a form of ‘choice-
consumption inconsistency’: “In situations where people choose between hedonic 
consumption options, the external consistency question becomes whether the option 
people choose delivers the best consumption experience. (…) If people choose an 
                                                 
10 It is interesting to remark that such risk of external inconsistency of choice, with respect to a purpose 
such as happiness, had been anticipated by Kant.   16
option that delivers worse consumption experience over one that delivers better 
consumption experience, holding costs constant, we say that they exhibit a choice-
consumption inconsistency”.  
Hsee’s (2003) explanation lies in the so called JE-SE mode distinction. He 
maintains that an important, though largely neglected, contributor to choice-
consumption inconsistency is evaluation mode, in the sense that choice is usually 
made in the Joint Evaluation (JE) mode, with several goods to be compared, whereas 
consumption occurs in the Separate Evaluation (SE) mode, where one good only (the 
one previously bought by the agent in the JE) is present. Once we take this distinction 
into account, we are not entitled to conclude that choice reveals the underlying 
preference structure of the agent. The simultaneous presence of multiple options to be 
compared ex ante generates a bias (Hsee and Zhang (2004) call it distinction bias) and 
may lead to choices which turn out to be unpleasant (or less pleasant than expected) 
ex post: evaluation mode may then drive a wedge between decision utility and 
experienced utility. 
  The choice-happiness wedge illustrated above is even more likely to occur in 
strategic interaction scenarios, i.e. in social contexts where agents interact 
strategically, constantly aiming at correctly predicting others’ preferences and 
behaviors. Interestingly, Sen (1973) seems to note that the gap between individual 
preferences and welfare is greater the more social interaction is complex, i.e., we 
could say, the more it takes place in a sophisticated, strategic interaction situation – 
the subject matter of game theory. As we observed above, it is frequently the case that 
the actual degree of happiness people experience ex post (experienced utility) 
significantly differs from the one expected ex ante (predicted utility). In social 
contexts where agents interact strategically, that general proposition holds because 
‘disappointing’ equilibria can occur even though every player would have preferred to 
end up in a different outcome (like inefficient, mutual defection equilibria in the PD). 
In such scenarios, it is worth specifying that, unlike what happens in non-strategic 
contexts, there is nothing inherently paradoxical in the fact that we cannot choose 
what we would prefer (e.g. a ‘I defect-You cooperate’ outcome in a PD for a selfish 
player) when our actions are interdependent the one with the other. This point is 
expressed very clearly by Binmore (1994): “Personally, I see no paradox at all in the 
fact that independent choice behavior by rational agents should sometimes lead to 
Pareto-inefficient outcomes. The rules of the Prisoners’ Dilemma create an   17
environment that is inimical for rational cooperation and, just as one cannot 
reasonably expect someone to juggle successfully with his hands tied behind his back, 
so one cannot expect rational agents to succeed in cooperating when constrained by 
the rules of the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.  
In social dilemmas and other strategic interaction environments, it is of interest 
to remark that selfish players could obtain better results if they behaved as if they had 
a preference for cooperation or through a principle of action other than utility 
maximization. In other words, in such contexts it is the case that if agents act on a 
non-maximizing principle of action, they may receive an individual benefit which is 
greater than the one they would obtain via explicit utility maximization. In the PD, for 
example, if we assume that players’ principle of action is, say, (pseudo)‘Kantian 
rationality’, then the equilibrium they reach is the best possible outcome this 
interaction scenario may yield from two different points of view, i.e. from both (a) a 
Kantian and (b) a utility-maximizing perspective. As to the former perspective, it is 
easy to see that the equilibrium outcome of mutual cooperation is consistent with the 
moral prescription each agent Kantianly decides to comply with, i.e. with the 
universalizable law prescribed by the categorical imperative illustrated in Kant’s 
Groundwork: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law”. As Sugden (1991) observes, “reasons may override 
desires: it may be rational to do what one does not desire to do. As the example of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests, this line of thought threatens to undermine game 
theory”. A very similar point was lucidly made by Rapoport (1987), arguing that 
developments of game theory “provide a rigorous rationale for Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative; act in the way you wish others to act. Acting on this principle reflects 
more than altruism. It reflects a form of rationality” (italics added).  
However, an even more interesting point is that such an equilibrium 
constitutes the best possible outcome even if agents were genuinely utility-
maximizing players and only ‘as if’ Kantians, i.e. had adopted a Kantian principle of 
action for purely instrumental reasons. In other words, in social dilemmas scenarios, 
being ‘englightened utility-maximizers’ who consciously decide to opt for a Kantian 
moral law but, at the same time, keep on evaluating their own welfare in purely 
preferential terms, may turn out to pay off, i.e. to be a better comprehensive strategy 
with respect to actual utility maximization. In this regard, Sen (1973) affirms that 
“Even in the absence of a contract, the parties involved will be better off following   18
rules of behaviour that require abstention from the rational calculus which is precisely 
the basis of the revealed preference theory. People may be induced by social codes of 
behaviour to act as if they have different preferences from what they really have”
11.   
In our view, this appears as one of the most interesting ‘paradoxes of 
happiness in strategic interaction scenarios’, i.e. a paradox arising in game-theoretic 
settings, where, by definition, rationality has a strategic and not a parametric nature. 
Anderson (2001), commenting on Sen’s (1977) famous essay, observes that what is 
foolish in a PD is not the lack of a preference for cooperation: “it is hardly foolish to 
not prefer the act of cooperating in itself, apart from its consequences. What is foolish 
about non-cooperators is not their preferences, which are perfectly understandable, 
but their principle of rational choice. And what makes that principle foolish is its act-
consequentialist structure. Any principle of rational choice that evaluates an 
individual’s act solely according to its marginal causal impact on valued outcomes 
will meet the same difficulties. This is one powerful reason why many people are 
drawn away from act-consequentialism toward rule-consequentialism, or toward non-
consequentialist frameworks”. 
On methodological grounds, such considerations suggest that introducing a 
softer link between preference and choice (i.e. a departure from the pure version of 
the revealed preferences approach) may allow for the achievement of important 
substantive results even within an ultimately utility-maximizing framework, as far as 
PD-like social interactions are concerned. In other words, what happens in social 
dilemmas (which are relatively special but rather frequent and relevant interaction 
scenarios) is somehow the opposite with respect to what is predicted by the ‘as 
though’ thesis defended by revealed preferences theorists. Their position is that any 
non-maximizing principle can, in fact, be conceptualized in maximizing terms, even 
when agents are not aware of this; by contrast, we claim here that, in social dilemmas, 
not only Kantian players preserve their identity at behavioral level and are neither 
actual nor ‘as though’ utility maximizers, but also that even utility-maximizers would 
                                                 
11 Similarly, with regard to the PD, Sen (1985) observes that “if people are ready to act 
(individualistically) on the basis of some ‘as if’ – more cohesive – orderings, then they can do better 
than acting individualistically in direct pursuit of their real goals. And they do better judged in terms of 
the real goals themselves” (see also Menicucci and Sacco (1996) for interesting insights on this).   19
better adopt an enlightened reasoning and, without altering their actual, ultimately 




6. Concluding remarks  
In the light of the analysis developed in the previous sections, we can identify 
the following advantages in adopting the approach suggested here. In the first place, 
such an analytical framework allows us to discriminate the causal role of (suitably 
defined) ‘preferences’ and non-preferential moral principles – seen as distinct 
determinants of ‘expected happiness’ – on individual behavior within strategic 
interaction settings. As a consequence, it can account for the complex interplays 
taking place between such two dimensions, so that, in principle, even potential 
conflicts between them (occurring at intra-individual level) may be explored. 
Recognizing that the search for happiness in advanced societies increasingly depends 
on such interaction between preferential and non-preferential factors seems to be a 
significant reason for proceeding along the path indicated above. 
Second, as we have seen, several important social scenarios exist where, 
insofar as we have recourse to non-utilitarian solution concepts such as, say, the 
Kantian principle of universalizability or team reasoning (see on this Sugden, 2000), 
individual players are capable of obtaining results which are Pareto-superior to the 
ones they would get within a classic, maximizing framework. In the light of the 
considerations developed in the last section, social dilemmas can be seen as one of the 
most interesting settings where, as far as the link between happiness, morality and 
game-theoretic solution concepts is concerned, paradoxical implications arise. The 
main thesis defended in Section 4 can be summarized as follows: in several social 
situations where agents interact strategically, even for utility-maximizers the 
achievement of the maximum degree of happiness may occur as a byproduct of non-
preferential principles of action, that is of principles of action not aimed at generating 
such effect. Symmetrically, within such strategic interaction environments, purposely 
utility-maximizing patterns of behavior lead to disappointing results: with regard to 
the PD, Aumann (1987) points out that “The universal fascination with this game is 
                                                 
12 It should be clear, at this stage, that while for expositional ease we are constantly referring to   
(pseudo)Kantian rationality, the line of reasoning developed here has a far wider reach and applies to 
any non-preferential principle of action which, in social dilemmas, is capable of making mutual 
cooperation a feasible equilibrium outcome.    20
due to its representing, in very stark and transparent form, the bitter fact that when 
individuals act for their own benefit, the result may well be disaster for all”. A further 
and related paradox within such settings has to do with the fact that, provided that 
they decide to behave as if they were driven by the pursuit of ends other than 
preference satisfaction, utility maximizers can get happier than by acting 
individualistically. Happiness can then arise, in the contexts under study, either as the 
predictable consequence of enlightened utility-maximizing agents or as an unintended 
effect of non-preferential behavior, but not as the predictable consequence of choices 
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